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The Covid-19 pandemic is one of the biggest global challenges the human 
race has faced since World War II. It has brought global panic, social and eco-
nomic disruption unprecedented for our time and has resulted in over half 
a million deaths. Faced with the spread of a deadly virus, restricted freedom 
under lockdown, being furloughed or fired from work, and the numerous 
other difficulties presented by the crisis, people worldwide have no doubt 
experienced a plethora of emotional responses and perhaps encountered new 
existential experiences. Two of the most salient, I would suggest, have been 
profound experiences of anxiety and boredom – anxiety about the virus, the 
changes the pandemic may bring to the world, the socio-economic precarity 
it has occasioned for many, but also boredom in the face of the lockdown and 
the lack of a normal social or working life. Here, I will engage Martin Hei-
degger’s penetrating philosophical account of the different varieties of anxi-
ety and boredom, showing its potential as an interesting conceptual toolkit 
for analysing certain phenomena in the human experience of the Covid-19 
crisis,  and for developing an account of their meaning and emancipatory 
potential. 
Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety and boredom as what I call ‘revelatory 
moods’ hinges on an unsettling phenomenon that characterizes them: an in-
ability to make sense of the world – something we have no doubt all been fa-
miliar with to some degree lately. In Heideggerian anxiety and boredom, we 
become so paralysed by anxiety or so profoundly bored that the structure of 
our world changes, the space of significance we usually inhabit drains away and 
we are temporarily, radically unable to make sense of anything. Perhaps such 
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anxious and boring encounters with the changing nature of our world have 
been occasioned by the Covid-19 pandemic. But it is not all doom and gloom: 
Heidegger argues that these intense existential experiences carry revelatory and 
emancipatory potential that should be celebrated and harnessed. Undergoing 
the unsettling experiences of anxiety and boredom allows for vital existential 
insights to be conveyed upon us about our predicament as human beings. They 
forcefully confront us with our freedom and bring us before our role as the 
creators and maintainers of the significance of the world as such. 
For Heidegger, anxiety and boredom function as catalysts for our being 
able to authentically seize hold of our lives and own our freedom, responsi-
bilities and sense-making role in a way that we would not be able to without 
these kind of experiences. Revelatory anxiety and boredom play an enabling 
role in this respect, providing us the necessary insight and experience for 
unlocking our existential potential. This is because revelatory moods involve 
an encounter with the structure of the world as such, in the moment of its 
breaking-down. Heidegger theorizes the world, individual and collective, as 
structured in terms of significance and meaning – everything in our worlds is 
encountered and understood in terms of what it means, its significance to us 
and our projects. This structure of significance is what constitutes the context 
in which we live, and it is only within this significance-structure that we are 
able to make sense of things at all. The analysis of world as significance-struc-
ture gives us a framework for pinpointing, in a literal sense, how the world 
has changed as a result of Covid-19 – what has become significant, more or 
less significant, what has arisen as meaningful, disappeared as insignificant, 
and how the world is arranged. Revelatory moods convey the structure of the 
world to us when this structure temporarily breaks down, which also confers 
various other implications on us concerning our freedom, responsibilities 
and role within our world.
In what follows, I will take Heidegger’s analyses of anxiety and boredom 
and apply them to the versions of these phenomena that have arisen in the pan-
demic. I hope to show that his work affords us a way of making sense of the way 
that the pandemic has challengingly confronted us not with the overwhelming 
potential of our freedom, but with its limits, and the changing nature of the social 
world. It is through the intense affective experiences of the current crisis that 
a more forceful kind of solidarity can potentially be forged, and new modes 
of enacting this solidarity can be engendered. Confronting us with the nature 
of our freedom compels us to engage with its limits and with the freedom of 
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others. Heidegger’s thought, therefore, offers a strong political dimension, de-
spite his repeated insistence that he was doing ‘ontology’, not politics or ethics. 
Moods, World and the Analytic of Dasein
In the late 1920s – especially Being and Time, What is Metaphysics? and The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics – Heidegger engaged deeply with the 
analysis of moods, often singling out anxiety and boredom as important ex-
amples. Before we can get to them, however, I will contextualize them within 
Heidegger’s overall project and his general account of moods, which takes 
place in what he calls an ‘analytic of Dasein’.1 Dasein is defined by Heidegger 
as being, among other things, the entity which can raise the question that 
defined his career above all: the question of the meaning of Being. Dasein can 
ask ‘what does being mean?’ because its own being “is an issue for it”2, some-
thing that concerns it, that it cares about and is disposed some way towards. 
Human beings are obviously a case of Dasein, but Heidegger avoids this 
term (and others like ‘consciousness’, ‘person’ or ‘subject’) to free us from any 
preconceptions of what he is analysing that we might inherit from the histor-
ical usage of these terms. The first step to answering the question of Being, 
according to Heidegger, is to conduct a thorough analysis of the existence of 
the entity which asks it, so we might know what its asking, understanding or 
answering the question would consist in. This famously leads Heidegger to 
distinguish his project as ‘fundamental ontology’, since it is solely concerned 
with and motivated by the question of Being. It is not an ethics, or a politics, 
but a descriptive analysis of the structure of Dasein’s existence, to prepare the 
way for answering the question of Being. Whether or not he was successful 
in his attempt to lay the groundwork for (or answer) his guiding question is 
debatable, but it is under the guise of the analytic of Dasein that Heidegger 
conducted much of his most interesting and influential work.
1 He explicitly attempts this in Being and Time, but he continues using ‘Dasein’, and 
analysing its being, throughout his career. His work in the late 1920s, that I will focus on 
here, in many ways seems like a direct continuation and expansion of what he attempts 
there, especially the analysis of boredom in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics and 
the development of the account of anxiety in What is Metaphysics?. 
2 Heidegger 1962, 32.
I transformed the references as 
usual, from now on. If there is 
correspondance in the final list we 
keep only name/date/page here in 
the notes.
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One of the analytics’ key findings is that moods play an important role in 
structuring Dasein’s existence: they are integrally involved in our being and con-
stitute part of the process by which we make sense of our world. When we ordi-
narily think about moods, we might think about being in a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ mood. 
How I feel about myself, my environment, the people and things I encounter, 
will depend on what mood I am in. If I am in a good mood, I will be more 
likely to find the things around me amusing, pleasant or inoffensive, rather than 
annoying, or tiresome – which I would be more likely to if I was in a bad mood. 
Moods give us an affective context to exist in at a given moment which alters our 
experience, and partially determine how we will make sense of our immediate en-
vironment. In Heidegger’s terminology, a mood is framed as a way of being ‘dis-
posed’ to one’s existence, and the term he uses to bring this out is Befindlichkeit, 
which can be translated as ‘disposedness’.3 Because our being is an issue for us, we 
are always concerned with it, always disposed to it in some way – ‘disposedness’ 
is an ever-present feature of our existence. But although we are always disposed 
to our existence, we are not always disposed to it in the same way. The different 
ways that our ‘disposedness’ can manifest itself are moods: “what we indicate […] 
by the term ‘disposedness’ […] [is] the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; 
our Stimmung [mood], our being-attuned” (Heidegger 1962, 172). The German 
Stimmung, as Macquarrie and Robinson point out,  is a “usual word for one’s 
mood or humour” (Heidegger 1962, 172, footnote 3). Moods, for Heidegger, 
are the different ways we can be disposed, or ‘attuned’ to our existence, as we can 
tune to different radio stations. Moods provide the affective contexts we exist in 
from moment to moment, and determine how we encounter and disclose (i.e. 
make sense of and reveal) everything around us. As Richard Polt writes: 
Moods are disclosive. They show us things in a more fundamental way than 
theoretical propositions ever  can. For example, fear does not cut  us off from 
things – to the contrary, it reveals something as a threat.4
3 Although not without some controversy, since no direct English equivalent is avai-
lable. However, the notion of being disposed towards one’s existence through moods 
is central to Heidegger’s account of them, and ‘disposedness’ arguably brings this out 
better than the other possible translations. For a helpful list of  alternative translations, 
see William Blattner’s webpage ‘Translations of Heidegger’s Jargon’ (https://faculty.
georgetown.edu/blattnew/heid/Heidegger-jargon.html).
4 Polt 1999, 66.
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Colloquially, moods are not always spoken of as having an object, or of 
being disclosive. Bad moods, especially, are often thought of as distorting, or 
as cutting us off from a more rational way of understanding our world, and 
sometimes the causes of our moods are not precisely known to us. Heidegger 
seems to agree that the cause of our moods is not always clear, speaking of 
them as things which “assail” us (Heidegger 1962, 176) without warning 
or consent. But far from cutting us off from the world, or having no object, 
moods are part of the way we make contact with the world and disclose the 
things in it as meaningful. A mood reveals our world and the things in it in 
a particular way, giving us different ways of apprehending them, which are 
not always positive. But just because a mood is negative or painful does not 
mean that it removes us from the world, or that it has no disclosive power – it 
is one of the many ways we are brought into contact with our world, a way 
we can be disposed to it, a way it can be encountered. In giving us a way to 
be disposed to our existence, moods give us a way of disclosing (revealing, 
encountering) the things around us, and ‘tuning in’ to our environment. Fear 
discloses the approaching gunman as threatening, or a situation as scary. The 
disclosive level moods work on, importantly, is more fundamental than that 
of rational processes such as knowing, reasoning, or thinking. Moods form 
part of a more primal way we have of making sense of the world. The way 
we feel about things partially determines how we will make sense of them be-
fore we rationalize about them. Before we can talk, or think philosophically, 
reason (etc.), we have moods, and we still make some kind of pre-linguistic, 
pre-rational sense of the things around us, even if we do not have the abil-
ity to linguistically express it. The sense we make of things is informed and 
affected by our mood - how we feel about things will determine (to some 
degree) how we engage with them and what level of significance we attribute 
to them. 
One of the driving insights of Being and Time is that rationality, knowing, 
and reasoning are only possible on the basis of this more primal way we have of 
making sense of things, which operates on a different level than and in a differ-
ent way to higher-order rationality. Moods are an integral part of this primal 
sense-making process. This is why Heidegger wrote that “to significations, 
words accrue” (Heidegger 1962, 204). Before we can talk about things, we 
must already have a grasp of them as being somehow significant, we must al-
ready be able to disclose them as being meaningful, such that we can identify 
and talk about them – they must, in some way, already ‘signify’ something. 
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As Robert Scharff writes: 
“historical-human life […] belongs to us and is possessed by us as an end-
lessly rich, diverse and multiply interested environmental experience that is 
an already meaningful process before it gets theoretically sliced up and conceptu-
alized.”5 
Prior to reasoning and knowing, we have a pre-reflective familiarity with 
the things around us, with moods partially constituting the process by which 
this familiarity comes about6 – a process that makes higher-order rationality 
possible. Even before we think, know about things – “they are meaningfully 
present to us”7 – and it is the pre-rational (but still meaningful) presence of 
things to us that interests Heidegger in his analysis of Dasein. Moods play 
a role in this basic sense-making process and partially account for how we 
disclose objects as meaningful on a pre-reflective level. It is always in terms 
of significance, usefulness, and meaning that things are ordinarily encoun-
tered in our experience – which is not to say that everything you encounter 
is significant to you, or very significant. Some things will be insignificant, 
or minimally significant – but everything is seen in the light of significance, 
understood in terms of it, and arranged in your world accordingly. 
This process does not happen in isolation, from object to object – every 
object that we encounter, everything we disclose as significant to some de-
gree, is fitted into the wider context of meaning we operate in. This context 
is comprised of an immeasurably complicated network of significant things 
and their relations, the totality of what you encounter in the course of your 
existence. This network, with the things in it arranged in relation to one 
another in terms of their significance and usefulness, is what Heidegger calls 
the ‘world’. Your world is a structure of significance, a “totality of involve-
ments” (Heidegger 1962, 116) comprised of everything you encounter and 
are involved with - which constitutes a context of meaning. The nature of 
5 Scharff 2019, xx, emphasis added.
6 ‘Partially constituting’ because Heidegger emphasizes how moods go hand in hand 
with other processes that structure our primal sense-making process, like what he calls 
‘understanding’ and ‘interpretation’. But to go into them here would take too much time 
and is not relevant to our topic.
7 Sheehan 2015, 111, emphasis added.
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this context, or “the worldhood of the world” as Heidegger calls it, is one of 
“involvement and significance” where everything is understood and related 
in these terms (Heidegger 1962, 114). My world is everything I am involved 
with that I apprehend as (to some degree, or negatively) significant. What an 
object means to you will be determined by its place in the significance-struc-
ture of your world, and the place it has there will be determined by what sig-
nificance it has, how much, and how it relates to other things in the structure. 
Moods partially constitute our pre-rational sense-making process by which 
we disclose things and fit them into the context of our world, which is struc-
tured in terms of significance and meaning. 
Heidegger on Anxiety and Boredom
Most moods do not stop us from living in our usual world of significance. 
Even in a bad mood, I can usually go about my business, operate functionally, 
deal with people, objects, etc. But there is an important variety of mood (that 
Heidegger identifies a type of anxiety and boredom as examples of ) where 
our everyday experience of the world is temporarily, radically altered. These 
‘revelatory moods’ are intense and unsettling, but contain revelatory, eman-
cipatory potential and are, if Heidegger is right, surely a significant formative 
experience for human beings. It should be noted that, in arguing that moods 
are integral to disclosing our world and coming to terms with our freedom, 
Heidegger is not committed to saying that moods always disclose correct-
ly and completely, or that they cannot distort our understanding of things. 
An angry mood can certainly distort our understanding of something, and 
certain moods may conceal things, rather than reveal them. People are very 
capable of self-deception, and our emotional responses to things often play a 
large role in this. Someone may refuse to believe something and be in denial 
about it because of the painful emotions they might feel upon realising its 
truth. But even if a mood is distorting something or disclosing something 
incorrectly, it is through the operation of the mood that we are able to make 
any sense (however confused) of the thing at all. Furthermore, Heidegger 
realises  that people do not always pay attention to the lessons their moods 
teach them, or heed  their insights. So while the existential and emancipatory 
potential of revelatory moods is great, it is important to bear in mind the 
potential shortcomings moods can have. But our focus here will be on what 
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it is  about our existential predicament that moods (correctly) disclose to us.
Heidegger emphasizes that revelatory anxiety [Angst] is “not […] the 
quite common anxiousness”, which he (perhaps wrongly) claims is “ultimate-
ly reducible to fearfulness”.8 Whether or not they are reducible, the reason 
Heidegger links ‘common’ anxiety to fear is because he argues that, like fear, 
common anxiety is always directed onto and disclosive of determinate things 
in the world. We get anxious about specific, easily-understandable things9: 
exams, dentists, work. But we also get anxious about less determinate things 
like the unknown, death, or the possibility of catching a virus. But in all 
of these cases, our anxiety is directed towards something meaningful, has a 
place in our world, has significance. Similarly, when Heidegger speaks about 
revelatory boredom [Langeweile], he does not mean the kind of boredom we 
might normally think of when we hear the word. Heidegger examines three 
types of boredom: “becoming bored by”, “being bored with”, and “profound 
boredom”.10 The first two types, like fear and (common) anxiety, are always 
directed toward determinate, significant things, the only difference is that in 
the first case it is a single thing (a book, film, TV show), and in the second, 
a set of things forming a context (a dinner party, a city, a job). These types 
of boredom may be interesting for other reasons, but they are not revelatory, 
according to Heidegger, in the same way ‘profound boredom’ is.
I will first spend a little time explaining what anxiety and boredom have 
in common before turning to their individual characteristics. Though they 
each have their own, specific existential insights to convey, they share some 
in common and involve similar, related experiences. What unites revelato-
ry boredom and anxiety, and distinguishes them from their more common 
counterparts, is that they both involve profound, total experiences of mean-
inglessness, where “all things and we ourselves sink into indifference […] 
[and] we can get no hold on things”. (Heidegger 1998, 88) Our worlds are 
usually structured and arranged in terms of significance and meaning, but 
8 Heidegger 1998, 88.
9 ‘Things’ or ‘objects’ used in this sense have a broad meaning, the object of my fear, 
anxiety or boredom need not be a physical object, or thing. Impending death, for example, 
could be an object of fear or anxiety, and it would still be a determinate thing in the context 
of one’s world, which has significance. 
10 Heidegger 1995, part I and II.
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in revelatory anxiety and boredom, significance recedes from us complete-
ly – “things become indifferent as a whole” (Heidegger 1995, 138). Because 
everything becomes insignificant in them, revelatory anxiety and boredom 
both involve a state where the entire structure of our world as such chang-
es, and we are temporarily but completely removed from our normal way 
of being. They both involve a state where we become unable to latch onto 
anything as significant or meaningful – we become unable to make sense of 
the world. The extent and intensity of this experience of meaninglessness 
is “overpowering” (Heidegger 1995, 136), and the inability  to make sense 
of things and latch onto them meaningfully extends even to ourselves. We 
become “an undifferentiated no one […] name, standing, vocation, role, age 
and fate […] disappear” (Heidegger 1995, 135-136). These things disappear 
when the significance of the world disappears because the significance-struc-
ture of the world is what provides us with a context of meaning where things 
make sense. If the significance of the world recedes from us, everything in 
our world that contributes to our understanding of ourselves, our identity, 
our lives, vanishes too. The experience of meaningless present in revelatory 
anxiety and boredom is also one of a thoroughgoing depersonalization.
But why do anxiety and boredom involve such experiences? Part of the 
answer can be found in something else they have in common: their object, 
what they are directed at and disclosive of, is not a determinate object in the 
world, but the world. Remember that the more common types of anxiety and 
boredom are all directed onto specific, determinate ‘objects’, understood in 
terms of their significance and placement in our world. In revelatory moods, 
however, no easy clarity about their object is available: 
anxiety does not ‘see’ any definite ‘here’ or ‘yonder’ from which it comes. 
That in the face of which one has anxiety is characterized by the fact that 
what threatens is nowhere. Anxiety ‘does not know’ what that in the face of 
which it is anxious is (Heidegger 1962, 231).
The reason that the object of anxiety is nowhere and cannot be ‘known’ 
to it, is because the object of anxiety is not an object at all and has no place in 
the world because “the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety” 
(Heidegger 1962, 231). Revelatory anxiety’s disclosive power comes from the 
fact that it is disclosive of our being-in-the-world, and the structure of our 
world as such. In anxiety, we are raised up from our usual immersion in a 
network of significance, removing us from our normal engagement with the 
world in an encounter with the world  itself. In the receding of significance, 
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we encounter it more forcefully because we now have an outside perspective 
to compare it to. It is the removal from our ordinary existence in significance 
that confers on us what this existence is otherwise always like. Similarly, in 
profound boredom, what we are bored with is not any particular object or 
objects at all, we are totally and completely bored, “elevated beyond the par-
ticular situation” (Heidegger 1995, 137). We become bored not with this, or 
that, but ‘it’: profound boredom happens “whenever we say, or better, when-
ever we silently know, that it is boring for one” (Heidegger 1995, 134). The 
‘it’ is no longer a specific item, set of items, or a worldly context – ‘it’ stands 
for our world as such, standing before us in cold indifference. This is how we 
can begin to understand why these moods have revelatory power: they involve 
a “decoupl[ing] from any relatedness to specific situations”11 which brings us 
into a sharp encounter with our world - the structure of significance where our 
lives take place – and makes us aware of this structure. Revelatory anxiety and 
boredom involve a “telling refusal” (Heidegger 1995, 137) – we are made aware 
of, ‘told’ the significance of the world by its temporary refusal, in a kind of ‘you 
don’t know what you’ve got until it’s gone’ experience. The absolute receding of 
the usual structure of the world present in revelatory anxiety and boredom is 
what allows us to appreciate the significance of the world as what it otherwise 
always is. Simply put, they allow us to realise the significance of significance. 
These are the things that revelatory anxiety and boredom have in com-
mon, but what differentiates them? What makes one anxiety and the other 
boredom? The best way to approach this is by considering how Heidegger 
characterizes the experience of them as being “related to Dasein’s innermost 
freedom” (Heidegger 1995, 136). Anxiety and boredom are both encounters 
with and experiences of our freedom – this is the key to their revelatory and 
emancipatory potential. But although they both bring us before the signifi-
cance of the world and our freedom, they do so in different ways, involving 
different affective states and different, unique insights to convey along with 
their shared revelation of our world and its structure. 
Let’s begin with anxiety. In revelatory anxiety, we are not anxious about 
any determinate thing in the world. We become so overcome with anxiety 
that the significance of things recedes and we are confronted with and par-
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of the nature, scope and burden of our freedom. The confrontation with our 
world and its structure is also an encounter with our possibilities – the things 
we can potentially do with our lives, the ability and responsibility we have to 
make choices about our lives and the lives of others. 
Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost abili-
ty-to-be [Seinkönnen] – that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing it-
self and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being 
free for the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility 
which it always is (Heidegger 1962, 232).
Anxiety makes manifest the weight of our freedom, confronting us with it 
in a sharp, intense encounter which enables us to take hold of our lives more 
fully. We are free to make own our choices and live in an authentic manner 
where we own these choices and responsibilities. We have an overwhelming 
range of possibilities, things we can achieve for ourselves and for others. Re-
alising all of this is coupled with the realisation of our role as human beings: 
we are freely responsible for the creation and maintenance of the significance 
of our world. We make and inhabit significance, and each bear responsibility 
for the meaning we attribute to things, the proliferation of meaning, the way 
we inhabit and construct a space of significance, and ultimately how we con-
duct our lives. We each have the responsibility to make choices for ourselves 
and others, the responsibility of inhabiting and shaping a world of meaning, 
and the responsibility to live up to these facts. Revelatory anxiety is anxious 
because: who wouldn’t feel anxious upon realising all this for the first time?
Revelatory boredom involves related, but different experiences. All types of 
boredom, according to Heidegger, are characterised by the fact that in them 
“time becomes long” (Heidegger 1995, 80), we are ‘held in limbo’ and ‘left emp-
ty’ (Heidegger 1995, 87). Boredom involves a feeling of unfulfilled emptiness 
where we are left hanging, feeling the weight of time as it stretches out, lacking 
any interesting, meaningful activity. We become welcoming of anything to pass 
the time and to not be bored anymore. But sometimes boredom can become so 
overwhelming that it extends to our existence as a whole, we become unable to 
latch onto anything (even ourselves) as significant, our world becomes indiffer-
ent and we are confronted with its structure of significance in a similar fashion 
to anxiety – we become bored not with this or that thing, but with our being-
in-the-world as such. In the refusal of significance, the structure of the world 
announces itself. The difference is that we encounter our freedom in a different 
way, it is disclosed to us through a different mood, we get a different perspec-
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tive on it. Rather than finding our freedom and possibilities anxiety-inducing, 
overwhelming and paralysing, we welcome and appreciate them because it is 
through them that we can alleviate boredom. Boredom also confronts us with 
significance, but it is a confrontation where we openly welcome it because our 
role as the keepers of significance is precisely what can stop us from having emp-
ty, boring and meaningless lives. Revelatory boredom reveals the possibility we 
have as human beings of making and deciding the significance of the world for 
ourselves. It also compels us toward a more authentic way of seizing hold of our 
existence because if we do, we will not be bored, and our lives will not be lacking 
in significance. The boring receding of things “‘point[s] to’ the possibilities that 
they nevertheless would or could offer to Dasein” (Slaby 2010, 115), and the fact 
that, if we choose to, we can make something of  these possibilities. 
Heidegger theorizes anxiety and boredom as revelatory moods that dis-
close the nature and scope of our freedom in a confrontation with our world 
and its being-structured by significance. It is through anxiety and boredom 
that these things get experientially revealed to us in an non-propositional, 
non-theoretical manner. Both involve a state where the significance of the 
world totally recedes and existential insights about our freedom and role are 
conveyed on us. Anxiety paralyses us before the stunning weight of our free-
dom, the responsibility we have over our choices, and the role we have in the 
creation and maintenance of the significance of the world. Boredom con-
fronts us with the same things, but in a state where we become more authen-
tically welcoming of our freedom and significance-constructing role, eager to 
grasp the opportunities they present to us with both hands to avoid boring, 
meaningless lives. Both anxiety and boredom act as catalysts for our being 
able to experience and realise these types of insight. Without such experienc-
es, we would not be able to seize hold of our existences fully authentically, or 
realise the full implications of being the kind of being that we are.  
Although Heidegger only discusses anxiety and boredom in detail, he also 
indicates that joy is a revelatory mood, neglecting to explain why (Heidegger 
1998, 87). After the 1930s, he never pursues the analysis of revelatory moods 
with the same rigour again – all of which might lead us to wonder a few 
things. Why anxiety, boredom and joy? Is it the same revelatory moods for 
every person? Do they all work in the same way for everyone? Are there more 
revelatory moods? Heidegger did not say as much as he perhaps should have 
on these issues, but a passage in What is Metaphysics? may be instructive here, 
where he is explicitly talking about revelatory moods.
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Being attuned, in which we ‘are’ one way or another and which determines 
us through and through, lets us find ourselves among beings as a whole. Find-
ing ourselves attuned not only unveils beings as a whole in various ways, but 
this unveiling – far from being incidental – is the fundamental occurrence of 
our Da-Sein (Heidegger 1998, 100, emphasis added).
Here, Heidegger indicates that revelatory moods reveal ‘in various ways’, 
and the experience of this multifaceted unveiling of existence is the funda-
mental occurrence of our lives. I find it plausible, therefore, that there could 
be other revelatory moods, that they may not all work in the same way from 
person to person, and that not every person will necessarily experience them 
all. But it is the ongoing experience of such moods that confer on us the nec-
essary existential insights we need to have authentic, rounded lives. 
Anxiety and Boredom in the Covid-19 Crisis
With this sketch of Heidegger’s analysis of revelatory moods in hand, let us 
turn to applying it to how the phenomena of anxiety and boredom have arisen 
in the Covid-19 pandemic, and see if we can use or develop Heidegger’s work 
to gain some insight into these experiences. In Heidegger’s framework, the 
emancipatory potential and power of anxiety and boredom is obvious: they 
involve direct confrontations with our freedom and possibilities, and act as 
an existential catalyst for seizing hold of them more authentically. Heidegger 
speaks of these moods as key to unlocking the potential of an authentic life, 
where we own our responsibilities, choices and actions, throwing ourselves 
into our worlds of significance with more force, taking on our role as mean-
ing-makers head-on. Revelatory moods allow us to view our range of possi-
bilities and get a sense of our amazing potential as freely acting beings which 
create and maintain significance. But this raises an important question: how 
could these moods work in this way, in a time when our freedom has been 
dramatically reduced, and the social world is changing so much? Surely in 
this current climate, our freedom and possibilities are not what they once 
were. No one was freer under lockdown, no one’s possibilities were increased 
in quarantine, and even as countries opened up again we still cannot do as 
much, or act as freely, as we could before. Is there room in our current time 
for an anxiety or boredom that is revelatory of the sheer magnitude of our 
freedom? Would they work in the same way, or convey the same insight? 
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Would a revelatory mood be revelatory of the world in the same way as before 
the pandemic, given that the social order and the significance-relations there-
in are changing so much? I want to suggest that, with some development, 
Heidegger’s analysis of revelatory moods can be made to speak to the human 
experience of the pandemic. But first, let us briefly consider what impact 
non-revelatory anxiety and boredom might have had.
The more common kinds of anxiety and boredom have manifested 
during the pandemic in some obvious ways. Whether it is anxiety about 
catching the virus, whether things will ever go back to normal, econom-
ic difficulty, about adapting to the new rules, anxieties of some sort have 
no doubt become commonplace for many.12 The same goes for boredom 
in quarantine or lockdown, when faced with restricted movement and a 
total lack of normal social life. In Heidegger’s framework, these moods 
do not have the same existential significance or emancipatory power as 
their revelatory counterparts. As troubling as they can be, they still remain 
firmly within the everyday world of significance, situated in a context of 
meaning, possibilities and projects where everything makes its usual kind 
of sense. But this does not mean that nothing can be learned from them, 
or that nothing good can come of them.13 People’s boredom can lead them 
to pursue acts of self-betterment: learning, taking up hobbies, reconnecting 
with friends on video-conferencing apps. Anxiety, though not pleasant, can 
lead people to be more vigilant and take more precautions. Obviously, this 
does not exhaust the positive and negative aspects of anxiety and boredom, 
and says nothing about how they might have become interwoven in var-
ious ways during the pandemic. But it is perhaps through a shared sense 
of anxiety and boredom during lockdown that has led people to find new 
ways of enacting solidarity to try and alleviate them, such as singing with 
neighbours, hosting ‘virtual pub quizzes’ or online exercise groups. Non-re-
12 A testament to this can be found in a cursory internet search for ‘Covid anxiety’, or 
similar. There are numerous articles, videos and websites dedicated to coping strategies 
for coronavirus anxiety. Take the UK’s National Health Service one as an example. 
https://www.nhs.uk/oneyou/every-mind-matters/coronavirus-covid-19-anxiety-tips/.
13 This is something Heidegger’s analysis of boredom does not deal with as much as it 
could, since his effort is largely concentrated on the experiences involved in the first two 
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velatory anxiety and boredom are experiences that can and have led to the 
emergence of different forms of solidarity, communication and connection 
as people adapted to the new normal of the pandemic. However, in Heide-
gger’s framework, as much potential as these moods have, they cannot have 
the same level of existential power as their revelatory counterparts. Whatev-
er their object, it cannot be our world or our existence as such because they 
are not sufficiently removed from significance to have an outside perspec-
tive on it – their ‘object’ is always something, or some things, in the world. 
They cannot, therefore, be revelatory in the sense Heidegger is interested 
in, and cannot bring the confrontation with our freedom or our being-in-
the-world that occurs in revelatory anxiety and boredom.
Which brings us back to the question of how revelatory moods might 
function in a time where our freedom and possibilities have been reduced, 
and the world is changing dramatically. Do revelatory moods still make sense 
or work in the same way in a pandemic? The question of the world is an easier 
one to answer, and one that Heidegger’s theorizing allows for more readily 
than the question of reduced freedom. Undoubtedly, the world has changed 
as a result of the pandemic, but how it is structured has not. The world is still 
structured in terms of significance, but the degree of significance attributed 
to certain things (and the way they relate to each other) is different now. 
People washed their hands and wore masks before Covid-19, so they still 
had significance – but the degree of significance attributed to them and the 
place they now have in our world has changed. Likewise with the lockdown 
rules of a given country and the changing degrees of significance of the things 
they prohibit, encourage, or regulate. Even something like going to the shop 
became a different experience with different kinds of significance operating 
on different levels, an experience now often tinged by risk and discomfort. 
Heidegger’s account of the world as significance-structure allows for some-
thing like a pandemic to take place and the world continuing to be structured 
in the same way, while giving us a conceptual toolkit for examining the re-
lations between things and the place in our lives they have, and tracking the 
way they change.  
The question of how our change in freedom affects revelatory moods is 
more interesting and difficult, and can be approached by engaging with a 
key tension in Heidegger’s thought – its connection with ethics and poli-
tics. Heidegger clearly speaks of revelatory moods as being central to un-
locking our authentic potential and realising our freedom, but he always 
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claims that he is only being ontologically descriptive and that there is no 
political theory or ethical assessment going on here. But from what we have 
seen already, it seems clear that heading the message of a revelatory mood 
would benefit your life more than ignoring it - though this is still a possi-
bility. Heidegger holds fast to the idea that he is being purely descriptive, 
that his project is one of ‘fundamental ontology’, not ethics or politics. He 
insists that his work “is purely ontological in its aims, and is far removed 
from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein, and from the aspirations 
of a ‘philosophy of culture’” (Heidegger 1962, 211). But given the language 
Heidegger uses throughout his analysis of Dasein, and what he actually 
says in it about Dasein’s being, this is surely one of the most questionable 
aspects of Heidegger’s thought. He speaks of ‘inauthentic’ and ‘authentic’ 
modes of existence, characterising inauthentic existence in terms of ‘fallen-
ness’, ‘idle talk’, ‘ambiguity’ and empty, un-guided ‘curiosity’ (Heidegger 
1962, 210-225). To exist inauthentically is to unthinkingly go along with 
the anonymous ‘they’ and ‘not be oneself ’ (Heidegger 1969, 163-169). We 
do not truly seize hold of our own identity and decide for ourselves who 
we want to be, but become immersed in the world of other people and 
take our identity from them: “everyone is the other, and no one is himself ” 
(Heidegger 1962, 165). However, the possibility remains of overcoming 
this inauthenticity (with the aid of revelatory moods) and leading an au-
thentic existence. Authentic existence is spoken of in terms of ‘choosing 
and taking hold of oneself ’ (Heidegger 1962, 232), of arising from the 
“inconspicuous domination by others” (Heidegger 1962, 164), coming to 
terms with our own mortality, integrating it into our understanding of our 
existence and achieving an “authentic being-towards-death” that consists of 
an ‘anticipatory resoluteness’ in the face of it (Heidegger 1962, division 2, 
parts 1, 2 and 3).
Heidegger never explicitly says that one way of being is ‘good or ‘bad’, or 
‘better’ or ‘worse’ than the other – but we need not follow him on this for 
his thought to be valuable for ethics or politics. How could authenticity not 
be better than inauthenticity? How could living without coming to terms 
with our mortality and identity be better than the alternative? How could re-
sponsibly seizing hold of our freedom not be a straightforwardly good thing? 
These questions are certainly worth pursuing in a critical development of 
Heidegger’s work, and are indicative of some of its biggest tensions. This 
is what makes it such an interesting case study for thinking about the rela-
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tionship between descriptive ontologies and political theorizing.14 Is it really 
possible to conduct a purely descriptive analysis of human existence, sociality, 
and freedom, that has nothing to do with politics? Heidegger seems, in some 
sense, to think so - but it is perfectly reasonable to object to him on this 
point. But thankfully we can build on his work in this way, even if he did not. 
Any ontology which explicitly concerns itself with our social existence, our 
freedom and the freedom of others, has a political dimension which should 
be seized upon and explored. Heidegger concertedly sidesteps human politics 
and ethics in favour of a more abstract ontology of Dasein to prepare for the 
question of Being. Whether he actually managed to demonstrate that his 
work took place on a more fundamental and different level than these things, 
must be put into question. I hope to show that, at least when it comes to 
revelatory moods, Heidegger’s work can be developed valuably on a political 
level, especially on the point of coming to terms with freedom. His analysis 
of anxiety and boredom can be used to make sense of certain experiences of 
the pandemic. 
It would be too easy to criticise Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein for being 
morbid, with all its focus on anxiety, fear, death (etc.) – because he always 
emphasizes the possibilities of authenticity and freedom that these experienc-
es open up. The way he frames revelatory anxiety and boredom is always in 
terms of us realising what we can do, the massive potential we have within 
our worlds of meaning that we construct. One might be sceptical that such 
experiences take place in the same way during a lockdown - where it seems 
more likely that we might be bored or anxious about all we cannot do -and 
whether there would be any emancipatory potential in such experiences. But 
I suggest that revelatory anxiety and boredom, in Heidegger’s sense, can take 
place in our current climate. Heidegger arguably frames revelatory anxiety 
and boredom more in terms of our positive freedom, what we can do, but 
surely it is possible that experiences of profound boredom and anxiety about 
the current global situation have occurred that have put people into contact 
with their reduced freedom. Revelatory anxiety and boredom are confronta-
tions with our range of possibilities, which is also necessarily a confrontation 
14 And also on the relationship between his ontology and philosophical anthropology, 
which he also claims he is not he is not doing. This despite the fact that the analytic of 
Dasein, even if it does more than this, just is an analysis of human existence.
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with the limits of these possibilities. Heidegger seemed to put more emphasis 
on positive freedom, but to be confronted with a sphere of meaningful pos-
sibilities is to be confronted simultaneously with the limits of this sphere.15 
The function a revelatory anxiety or boredom could have in a pandemic, 
therefore, could still be to reveal the scope of our freedom, it’s just that the 
freedom revealed in them would be dramatically reduced. But can an expe-
rience of reduced freedom contain the same emancipatory potential as an 
experience of our usual massive range of possibilities? In terms of its being 
revelatory of our role as meaning-makers, or the significance of the world, 
they can. This is because they still involve a temporary but complete change 
in the structure of our world, which gives us an outside perspective on it. If 
the structure of our world completely changes, we get a perspective on what 
it is otherwise always like, even if our sphere of possibilities is reduced. They 
can therefore still unlock the possibility of living authentically in the sense 
that Heidegger envisioned. 
But perhaps there is a different dimension to the revealing of freedom 
present in this variety of revelatory anxiety and boredom that is not present 
in a pre-pandemic one. Could we not build on Heidegger and argue that 
there are actually two ways that our freedom can manifest itself in anxiety 
and boredom, and that there are slightly different existential insights that arise 
in them? In pre-pandemic revelatory anxiety and boredom, we get an over-
whelming sense of what we can do, with our range of possibilities unfettered 
by lockdown. This encounter is a necessary precondition for our being able to 
press forward authentically into our possibilities. But in pandemic/ lockdown 
anxiety and boredom, we encounter our lack of freedom, our reduced range 
of possibilities. But the encounter with our lack of freedom is just as crucial 
for our being able to live authentically. This existential encounter is a neces-
sary precondition for being able to live authentically in spite of our reduced 
freedom. It is the encounter with and realisation of our new, reduced range 
of free action that allows the process of working out how to live within it to 
begin, and how to maximise our freedom and meaning-making abilities un-
der these conditions. It is only on the basis of this realization that any possi-
bility of adapting to the new situation can present itself, or any new mode of 
15 This is something that he delves into when he argues in division 2 of Being and Time 
that anxiety is also the mood where our death, the limit of our existence, is disclosed.
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emancipatory action could be conceived and practised in spite of our newly 
reduced freedom and change of situation. Non-revelatory anxiety and bore-
dom might also lead people to engage in solidarity-forging or emancipatory 
practises, but Heidegger gives us a way of making sense of the idea that this 
type of action is only possible on the basis of a more fundamental, profound 
revelation of our reduced freedom, found in revelatory anxiety and boredom. 
We cannot be expected to live authentically within, or adapt to, our lack of 
freedom if we do not first encounter its range. Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety 
and boredom locates the possibility of the disclosure of our range of possibil-
ities in experiences of anxiety and boredom.
Another productive aspect of Heidegger’s work is that it not only analy-
ses the general, necessary structures of human existence, but gives us a way 
of specifying how these necessary structures generate various, contingent 
manifestations. Because they are a necessary precondition for realising our 
freedom, it is a necessary fact that people undergo experiences of revelatory 
moods – they are a general structure of human existence. However, this is 
not to say that everyone experiences the same ones, or reacts the same way to 
them. Some people may never experience revelatory anxiety, but might expe-
rience revelatory boredom. It is a possibility that someone experiences them 
and does not seize an authentic hold on their free possibilities, and continues 
to live an inauthentic existence. It is worth noting that experiences of reve-
latory anxiety and boredom in the pandemic have perhaps not all generated 
the same responses. Although the confrontation with freedom in anxiety and 
boredom has led many to engage in solidarity-forging practises and act for 
the health and betterment of the community – wearing masks to protect 
others, for instance – not everyone has responded this way. The growing an-
ti-mask sentiment in some countries, like the USA, could be understood as a 
reaction to a certain anxiety or boredom, but from out of a different (perhaps 
inauthentic) perspective. The anti-mask rhetoric is often framed in terms of 
personal freedom and freedom from government interference. Perhaps there 
might be room for a way of making sense of this in Heideggerian terms: the 
anti-maskers have had the same confrontation with their lack of freedom as 
others, but this experience has generated a different response in them. The 
confrontation with their lack of freedom has led them to decry masks as 
oppressive, and advocate for a (perhaps anxious) scepticism about govern-
ment overreach and suppression of liberties. But is it not possible that such 
a reaction, however misguided, could be engendered from a confrontation 
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with one’s lack of freedom, as in the pandemic variety of revelatory anxiety 
and boredom? 
Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety and boredom gives us a way of making sense 
of the existential potential of profound experiences of anxiety and boredom 
that have no doubt characterised the Covid-19 pandemic for many. As difficult 
as these experiences may be, they contain the potential of a sharp encounter 
with our freedom because they involve an experience of a complete loss of 
significance of the world. Such experiences remove us from world of everyday 
concerns, giving us an outside perspective on it. To be raised out of our usual 
world of significance into a complete experience of meaninglessness confronts 
us with what this world is otherwise always like, and the opportunities it offers 
us when we are in it. In the pandemic, such experiences would arguably be 
quite different because our sphere of possibilities is dramatically reduced. How-
ever, it is only when we encounter our reduced range of possibilities that we can 
begin to live in spite of them, find ways to adapt to the new situation, and enact 
any kind of solidarity-forging and emancipatory practises in spite of it. Within 
Heidegger’s theory is not just a general explanation of the function of revelatory 
anxiety and boredom, and a sketch of revelatory moods as a general structure 
of human existence, but also a way of categorising the varying responses people 
might have to such experience. Not all people will react to a confrontation with 
their lack of freedom the same way, despite undergoing similar experiences.
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